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LOVE THY CHILDREN 
Reflections on the Barre Debt Neutrality Theorem* 
Philippe WEIL 
Harvard UniversiTy Cambridge, MA 01238, USA 
This paper proves that Barro’s (1974) debt neutrality proposition, whose relevance hinges, in an 
economy with bequest.motives, on bequests being operative in the economy without public debt, 
is not applicable to a wide class of overlapping generation economies - those with a ‘weak 
bequest motive. In particular, it is shown that the bequest motive is always too weak, and public 
debt therefore non-neutral, when non-physical assets have a well-defined function (reducing 
oversavings) in the corresponding economy without bequest motive, i.e., when the non-altruistic 
economy is dynamically inefficient. 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the theoretical relevance of the Barro (1974) debt 
neutrality proposition. 
In his celebrated 1974 article, Barro had shown that, provided that agents 
loved their descendants and actually left them positive bequests, finite hori- 
zons were no impediment to the operation of a debt neutrality theorem. If 
finitely-lived consumers had already chosen to leave positive bequests to heirs 
in the absence of government debt, the introduction of public debt would not 
affect the agents’ optimal consumption plans as it would not create new 
opportunities to transfer resources from children to parents. The size of the 
national debt would thus not matter in equilibrium. 
The applicability of this neo-Ricardian argument clearly hinges, in an 
economy with a bequest motive, on whether bequests are indeed operative in 
the economy without government debt. Although this is an important issue, it 
has not been resolved by previous authors. Barro (1974, p. 1106) had some 
feeling for the factors likely to generate operative bequests, but he did not 
provide any formal analysis. Drazen (1978) followed Barro’s lead, but his 
paper did not yield any explicit condition under which bequests may be 
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operative. While both Buiter (1979) and Carmichael (1982) described sta- 
tionary equilibria with operative intergenerational transfers, neither derived 
any existence condition. 
To derive such a condition, it is necessary to realize that bequests are, within 
the two-period overlapping generation framework used by Barr0 (1974), an 
intergenerational transfer from the old to Ihe young. Now we know, in particu- 
lar since Gale (1973) and from the work of Wallace (1980) and Tirole (1985) 
that there exists a deep connection between the efficiency properties of 
overlapping generation economies without bequest motives and the direction 
of Pareto-improving intergenerational transfers.’ Under reasonable assump- 
tions, the dynamic inefficiency that may occur in Diamond (1965) economies 
may be removed by the introduction of intergenerational schemes, such as fiat 
money, bubbles, social security and government debt, which transfer goods 
from the young to the old. Hence, on theoretical grounds, there exists a 
relationship between the efficiency characteristics of the economy without 
bequest motive, and the possibility of bequests being operative in the economy 
with public debt. 
We indeed prove that a necessary and sufficient condition for bequests to be 
operative, either in an exchange economy or, under some assumptions, in a 
stationary production economy, is that parents love their children ‘enough’. 
More precisely, we show that the intercohort discount factor applied by 
parents to their heirs’ utility must not be smaller than a threshold level which 
depends on the discrepancy between the steady state interest rate of the 
economy without bequest motive and the economy’s growth rate - i.e., on the 
‘size’ of the (in)efficiency of the economy without bequest motive. In particu- 
lar, we prove that bequests cannot be operative at all dates in the no-debt 
economy when the economy without bequest motive is dynamically inefficient. 
As a consequence, the neo-Ricardian debt neutrality proposition is inapplica- 
ble to a wide class of overlapping generation economies. 
The next section of this paper derives the condition for operative bequests 
in a simple exchange economy with a bequest motive. This condition is 
extended, in section 3, to a production economy. Section 4 introduces uncer- 
tainty. The conclusion summarizes the paper. 
2. Bequests Exchange economy 
We consider a simple two-period overlapping generations exchange econ- 
omy with a bequest motive: parents love their children. We ask the following 
question. Under which condition will parents choose to leave positive bequests 
to their descendants? Answering this question obviously amounts to determin- 
‘As Cass, Okuno and Zilcha (1980) have shown, this connection may disappear when within- 
cohort heterogeneity is introduced. This paper will follow Barre’s (1974) article by assuming that 
all consumers belonging to the same generation are identical. 
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ing the applicability of Barro’s (1974) debt neutrality theorem to an economy 
with a bequest motive.2 
2.1. The basic framework 
We adopt Barro’s (1974) formalization of the bequest motive: parents care 
about their children’s utility, and have the same preference ordering over 
goods as their heirs. We assume that utility is separable, both intertemporally 
and intergenerationally.3 Agents live for two periods, with lifespans over- 
lapping so that the children’s first period of life corresponds to the parent’s 
second period. All consumers are identical, except for their age. Output is 
non-produced and non-storable, and agents receive endowments e, > 0 when 
young and e2 2 0 when old of this consumption good. A young agent can buy 
or sell claims on next period’s endowment at the real interest rate R. The 
structure of the model implies, however, that the market for consumption 
loans must be inactive in equilibrium, since intragenerational trade is pre- 
cluded by the assumption that all agents of the same age are identical, and 
intergenerational loans are impossible when agents live only for two periods. 
Therefore, we will not introduce consumption loans explicitly below but will 
instead implicitly define the real interest rate as the marginal rate of substitu- 
tion between present and future consumption. As we are interested in the 
equilibrium without government debt or other non-physical asset, the only 
possibility effectively offered to an agent to smooth out his consumption 
profile is to give a (pleasurable) bequest to each of his/her (1 + n) children, 
n 2 0. We assume that fertility is exogenous (n is a given parameter), that 
birth occurs by parthenogenesis (there is no marriage), and that all children 
are equally treated by their parent [each parent leaves the same bequest to 
each of its (1 + n) heirs].4 
21n the sole presence of a bequest motive, Barre’s (1974) debt neutrality theorem is applicable if 
and only if bequests are operative at all dates in the absence of government debt. As mentioned by 
Barre (1974) himself and emphasized by Carmichael (1982) however, the debt neutrality proposi- 
tion may also hold in the presence of operative gifts from children to parents. We purposefully 
exclude gift motives (children loving their parents) from our analysis, as the specification of 
preferences, the characterization of equilibrium, and the possible absence of an intertemporal 
government budget constraint in the presence of a gift motive are issues outside the scope of this 
paper [see Carmichael (1982) Buiter and Carmichael (1984), Burbridge (1983,1984), Abel (1985) 
and especially Kimball (1986) on this point]. 
‘The assumption of intertemporal separability could easily be relaxed, in this one-good 
economy, without affecting our results. Intergenerational linear separability, however, is crucial to 
our analysis. Abel (1986) has studied the implications of relaxing this assumption by introducing 
‘concave altruism’. 
4For a relaxation of the first assumption, see Becker and Barre (1986). For the implications of a 
model with bequest motives and marriage, refer to Bemheim and Bagwell (1985). As for 
environments in which the assumption of equal treatment might be violated (e.g., primogeniture 
economies) and in which the neo-Ricardian debt neutrality proposition obviously does not hold, 
they are not the focus of this article. 
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A consumer representative of generation I thus chooses cl,, cz,, b,,, to 
maximize 
v,= 4%) + PU(C2,) + Yv,Sl~ 0) 
subject to 
cl, = e, + b,, 
c2,+(l+n)b,+l=e2, 
cl,, cz,, b,+l 2 0, 
(2) 
(3) 
(4 
q, e2, b, given, 
where 
u(m) = utility derived from goods, u’ > 0, u” < 0, u’(0) = co, u’(co) = 0, 
Cl = maximum utility attainable by a generation t + 1 agent, given the 
bequest received from his parent, 
Cl, = first-period consumption of an agent born at r, 
C2t = second-period consumption of an agent born at t, 
b t+1 = bequest left by an agent born at I to each of its (1 + n) generation 
t + 1 children, 
B = intertemporal discount factor (0 < /? I l), 
Y = intercohort discount factor (0 < y I 1).5 
The first-order conditions for an optimum are given by (1) (2), (3) (4) and 
=0 if bt+l>O. (5) 
Formula (5) simply states that, if one chooses to leave a positive bequest, the 
utility value, at time I, of bequeathing one unit of good to each of (1 + n) 
children must be equal to the pleasure derived from seeing these children 
consume that bequest in the first period of their life. Notice that, because of 
the assumption that the consumption good is not storable, and because the 
SThe assumption y < 1 imposes intercohort utility discounting. To see this, rewrite y = 
py’(l + PZ), to reflect the fact that y incorporates both a pure time preference element /3 (my 
children enjoy their utils tomorrow) and a pure interpersonal discount factor y’ (one util accruing 
to one of my children is worth y’ utils to me), and the assumption that each parent cares equally 
about its (1 + n) children. y is thus the overall contribution to a parent’s utility of an extra util 
accruing tomorrow to each of his/her (1 + n) children. This specification is equivalent to 
Burbridge’s (1983,1984). In the presence of a preference for future cohorts’ utils (y > l), the 
existence of an optimal consumption program is problematic. 
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consumption loan market is inactive in equilibrium, we need not invoke the 
envelope theorem to compute dU,T,/db,+,. 
From these first-order conditions, we find that the optimal bequest left by 
an agent of generation t must satisfy 
u’[e,+ b,,,] -p(l +n)y-‘u’[e,- (1 +n)b,+,] ~0 (6) 
=0 if b,+l>O. 
Define the implicit real interest rate in the absence of bequests as 
l+R=u’(e,)/[pu’(e,)]. 
We then immediately have: 
Proposition I. Bequests are operative (b > 0) in the exchange economy if and 
only if 
i.e., if and only if the bequest motive is strong enough. When this condition is 
satisfied, equilibrium bequests are time-independent and uniquely defined by the 
equation 
u’[e, + b] =/3(1 +n)y-‘u’[e,- (1 +n)b]. 
Proof. Obvious from the properties of u( .), (6) and the definition of i?. 
The condition of Proposition 1 relates all the parameters characterizing our 
exchange economy. It provides an intuitive result, namely that bequests 
motives must not be too weak if bequests are to be operative. But, more 
interestingly, we have the following: 
CYrollaty. If the economy without bequest motive is dynamically inefficient 
(R < n), then bequests cannot be operative in the economy with a bequest motive. 
Proof. When R -C n, satisfaction of the condition of Proposition 1 requires 
y > 1, which is impossible. 
This corollary confirms the intuitive reasoning of the introduction, in which 
we had established the connection between the efficiency characteristics of the 
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economy without bequest motive and the possibility that bequests may be 
operative when parents love their children. Heuristically, when the economy 
without bequest motive is dynamically inefficient, it takes intergenerational 
transfers from young to old (fiat money, social security) to achieve a 
Pareto-superior allocation. In that context, bequests, which transfer goods 
in precisely the opposite direction, would result in a Pareto-inferior 
allocation - which is the reason why they cannot be chosen positive by 
altruistic agents who, through a bequest motive, act as social, or rather 
dynastic, planners. In fact, it is straightforward to show that when x < n, 
parents would indeed like to choose negative bequests (b’< 0), so that children 
would indeed make gifts to their parents. This outcome is however ruled out 
in this economy in which children do not love their parents and in which gifts 
cannot, as a consequence, be voluntary. 
Proposition 1 and its corollary thus show that dynamic efficiency of the 
economy without bequest motive is a necessary condition for the neo-Ricardian 
debt neutrality theorem to be applicable to an economy with a bequest motive. 
Moreover we see, from (5) that the (implicit) real interest rate when bequests 
are operative is simply 
u’( c,>/[ puq c,)] = (1 + rr)/y 2 1+ n. 
Hence although the presence of operative bequests lowers the real interest rate 
relative to the no bequest economy [as (1 + n)/v < 1 + R], it never does so to 
such an extent that the economy with a bequest motive becomes inefficient. 
In the following section, we examine whether it is possible to generalize 
these results to a neo-classical production economy. 
3. Bequests: Production economy 
We now modify the framework of the previous section, and assume that 
output, instead of being non-storable manna from heaven, is produced through 
a neoclassical production function, which we write, in intensive form, f(k), 
where k is capital per young agent. We assume that the production function 
exhibits constant returns to scale, and that f’ > 0, f ‘(0) = 03, and f ” -e 0. 
There is only one good in the economy, which can either be consumed or used, 
in combination with labor, as an input into the production process. 
Competitive profit maximization by firms leads to the following conditions: 
r,=f ‘(k,) = r(k,), 
w, =f k) - k,f ‘(k,) = w(h), 
where r, and w, denote the interest and wage rate at t. 
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As in Diamond’s (1965) model, we assume that the young inelastically 
supply one unity of labor when young, and retire when old. An agent born at t 
can buy x, umts of capital when young. A consumption loan market is not 
introduced explicitly, as it will again be inactive in equilibrium. To be 
consistent with the previous section, we assume that children receive their 
bequest at birth, i.e., that bequests are transmitted to children at the beginning 
of the parent’s retirement.6 
Under this specification, the budget constraints facing consumers, and the 
first-order conditions for an interior optimum with operative bequests are, using 
the envelope theorem to compute dU,$,/db,+,, 
cl, + x, = w, -I- b,, (9 
c2t+ (I+ n)b,+l = (1 + r,+lh 
C1r* C2t9 x,, b,+l 2 0, 
U’khl = PO + 1;+1b’b2119 
PC1 +n>u’[c,,l =yu’[cl,+J. 
(10) 
(11) 
Eq. (13) is a static relation, implicitly giving, for any given amount C,+r = 
crr+r + c,,/(l + n) of per capita aggregate consumption, the optimal intergen- 
erational allocation at t + 1: 
C2r = W,+A C1r+1- r+l -C - (1 + n)-WC,,,), 
with 
Using this definition of @( .), it is straightforward to show that (12), in 
combination with (13), is simply the first-order condition of the infinite-hori- 
zon dynastic intertemporal allocation problem: 
subject to 
C, + x, = (1 + r,)x,-r/(1 + n) + w,, 
6The presence of a physical store of value makes it possible to envisage an alternative 
specification in which bequests are transmitted by the old at death, and hence received by children 
at the beginning of their retirement. It would lead to results identical with ours. 
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where 
u(c) = u’[@(C)].’ 
This decqmposition of the dynastic optimization program into separate intra- 
and intergenerational problems is, of course, the decentralized analogue of 
Samuelson’s (1968) two-part golden rule. 
3.1. Steady-state equilibrium 
Substituting the equilibrium condition x, = (1 + n)k,+ r, (7) and (8) into (9) 
to (13), we find that a steady-state perfect foresight equilibrium must satisfy 
c,=w(k)-(l+n)k+b, (14) 
c2= [l +r(k)](l +n)k- (l+n)b, 
u’(q) = P[l + r(k)] u’h), 
l+r(k)=(l+n)/y=l+r*, 
Cl, c2 2 0, 
b 2 0. 
07) 
(18) 
09) 
Eq. (17) states that, in steady state, the equilibrium interest rate must be 
equal to r*, which is simply the modified golden rule interest rate. Note that, 
as in Samuelson (1968), the steady-state interest rate does not depend on fi, 
but only on the intergenerational discount factor y. Let k * =f’-‘(r*) denote 
the modified golden rule capital stock. Eqs. (14), (15), and (16) uniquely 
determine c:, CT, and b * as functions of k *. 
To determine the conditions under which this solution satisfies the non- 
negativity constraint on bequests, notice first that, from the properties of the 
u(-), 
b*$O as u’[w(k*)-(l+n)k*] 
$p(l+r*)u’[(l+r*)(l+n)k*]. (20) 
Now let S[w, r] be the solution to U’[W - S] = /I(1 + r)u’[(l + r)S], i.e., the 
savings function of an economy without bequest motive. We can then rewrite 
(20) as 
b*$O as S[w(k*),r(k*)] $(l+n)k*. (21) 
‘The u( ) function has all the properties of the u( ) function: u’ > 0, o’(O) = 00, u’(co) = 0, 
u” c 0. If u(.) is isoelastic, then u(C) = z(C), where z is a positive constant depending on /3,, y, n 
and the elasticity of marginal utility. Thus, with isoelastic tastes, the same utility function can be 
used to evaluate aggregate and individual consumption (up to the constant z). This is obviously 
not true in general. 
P. Weil, Barre’s debt neutrality theorem 385 
To replicate the results of the exchange economy, we need to make the 
following assumptions: 
Assumption 1. The equation g(k) = S[w(k), r(k)] - (1 + n)k = 0 has a unique 
positive solution, denoted k. 
Assumption 2. The function g(k) has the following property: 
g(k) ~0 for all kE]O,k[, 
=0 for k=k, 
~0 forall k>k. 
Assumption 1 guarantees the unicity of the steady-state capital stock, 
defined as x, of the economy without bequest motive studied by Diamond 
(1965). Assumption 2 can easily be shown to be equivalent to the assumption 
that this steady-state capital stock is stable and that convergence to z is 
non-oscillatory; Assumption 2 also ensures that positive steady-state bequests 
be associated with an increase in capital accumulation (relative to the 
Diamond economy without bequest motive), or, equivalently, with a decline in 
the real interest rate. Since the same decline occurs in the exchange economy, 
Assumption 2 is needed to make the production economy analogous to the 
exchange economy. Both assumptions are used, in the guise of existence, 
uniqueness and stability assumptions, by Diamond (1965). 
We can now extend our results to the case of a production economy in: 
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions I and 2, bequests are operative (b * > 0) in 
the stationary production economy if and onb if 
Y > Cl+ n)/O + i>, 
where F = f ‘(k) is the steady-state interest rate of the Diamond (1965) economy 
without bequest motive. 
Proof. Follows immediately from (21) and Assumptions 1 and 2. 
A heuristic interpretation of this proposition runs as follows, Assumptions 2 
imposes that intergenerational transfers from old to young (positive bequests) 
effectively increase, in long-run equilibrium, capital accumulation and de- 
crease the steady-state interest rate - which is an arguably reasonable restric- 
tion to impose on tastes and technology.’ Now we know, from (17), that the 
‘Were we to abandon Assumption 2, our results would be reversed and our model would yield 
counterintuitive conclusions, as would Diamond’s (1965). 
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Table In 
II’ 
h 1% 3% 5% 7% 
0.25 0.49 0.59 0.66 0.70 
0.50 0.73 0.98 1.18 1.32 
0.75 0.87 1.25 1.60 1.86 
“This table gives the minimum discount factor (1 + rt)/(l + F) consistent with bequests being 
positive in steady state. It is assumed that tastes are logarithmic, so that /I = j?/(l + /3) is the 
propensity to save out of first-period income in the absence of bequests. The production function 
is taken as being Cobb-Douglas, with a share of capital equal to 25%. II’ is the annual growth 
rate of the economy, so that 1 + II = (1 + ~1’)~~ given a period (half-life) of 35 years. An entry 
greater than one in the table indicates that the associated Diamond economy is dynamically 
inefficient. 
long-run interest rate is equal to r *, the modified golden rule interest rate. If 
intergenerational transfers are operative,from old to young, it must be the case 
that they increase the steady-state capital stock relative to the Diamond (1965) 
economy. A necessary condition for bequests to be operative in the long run is 
thus that k * > k, or 1 + r * = (1 + n)/y < 1 + F. Proposition 2 shows that this 
condition is also sufficient. In table 1, we compute the minimum intercohort 
discount factor, (1 + n)/(l + F), consistent with bequests being operative in 
steady state for the case of logarithmic utility and production functions. This 
table suggests that operative bequests require, for plausible parameter values, 
extremely low intercohort discount rates.’ 
As in the case of the exchange economy, dynamic inefficiency of the 
economy without bequest motive is sufficient to rule out operative bequests in 
the economy with a bequest motive; similarly, dynamic efficiency of the 
Diamond economy is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for bequests to 
be operative when parents love their children. 
3.2. Transition path 
Substituting (7) and (8) into (12) and (13), and using the definition of u(a), 
we find that, if bequests are operative at all dates, the equilibrium dynamics of 
aggregate consumption and of the capital/labor ratio are given by 
u’K+A = {[I+ r*l/[l + rbC+Al~ u’WJ9 
c, = k +f k) - 0 + 4k+lv 
(22) 
‘Some care must be exercised in inferring from this table the minimum required interpersonal 
discount factor (y’), as the intercohort discount factor (y) potentially depends both on PI and p 
(see footnote 5). 
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a pair of difference equations admitting a unique steady state (k *, C *.), with 
C * =f( k *) - nk *. The resulting bequest is then given, from (lo), by 
b,= [l +r(k,)]k,-@(C,)/(l +n). (24) 
The initial capital stock k, found by the original generation in the Garden 
of Eden will, however, in general differ from its long-run value k *. Unlike in 
the exchange economy in which there is no state variable, we must worry, in 
the production economy, about the equilibrium dynamics of this economy. It 
can be shown that, if bequests are operative at all dates, then the modified 
golden rule capital stock is globally saddlepoint stable with k, and C, 
increasing (decreasing) towards their long-run levels if k, < (>)k *, and that 
this saddlepath trajectory is the unique equilibrium (as the dynastic equi- 
librium replicates the standard infinite horizon, representative agent equi- 
librium). The difficulty, however, resides in determining necessary and 
sufficient conditions under which bequests will be operative at all dates given 
an initial capital stock k, differing from k*. 
As it is unfortunately very hard to analytically derive these conditions, we 
adopted a numerical approach. For a given intergenerational discount factor 
y, we searched for the minimum capital stock k,, such that, along the 
saddlepath leading to the modified golden rule k*, bequests be operative if 
k, r k,,. We specified the production function as being Cobb-Douglas, with 
a 25% share of capital in output, and we took u(e), and thus v(e), as being 
isoelastic, with an Arrow-Pratt curvature u. Setting /3, n, u, and varying y, we 
computed b, from (24) and established the following: 
Numerical summary 
(1) If y < (1 + n)/(l + i), bequests cannot be operative at all dates whatever 
the initial capital stock. 
(2) If y = (1 + n)/(l + Y), bequests are operative at all dates if k, > k * = k. 
They cannot be operative at all dates if k, < k *. They are equal to zero at all 
dates ifk,= k*. 
(3) If y > (1 + n)/(l + F), bequests are operative at all dates if and only if 
k, 2 k,,, where kti,, < k * is a decreasing function of y satisfying k,, t k * as 
y J (1 + n)/(l + F). Bequests are an increasing function of the capital stock. 
These simulation results, which hold for all choices of /3, n and u, are very 
intuitive. If the condition of Proposition 2 is violated (case 1 of the numerical 
summary), bequests cannot be operative at all dates, for, if they were, the 
capital stock would converge, from what was said above, to k* and bequests 
to b* < O! Even if steady-state bequests are positive (case 3 of the summary), 
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bequests cannot be operative at all dates on the transition path if agents are 
‘poor’ initially, in the sense that the initial capital stock is too small (relative 
to kti). The rationale of this result is that, with a small initial capital stock, 
an optimal dynastic consumption profile would involve, if bequests were not 
constrained to be non-negative, redistributing goods away from the children 
towards their parents, i.e., letting bequests be negative as long as k, c kti, 
and positive thereafter. As should be expected, the agents’ perception of 
‘poverty’, k&, depends on how they value their children’s utility, i.e., on y: 
the less the parents value their heirs’ utility (the smaller y), the larger the 
minimum capital stock required for bequests to be positive (the larger kti). 
What happens when k, -K k,, or when y s (1 + n)/(l + F) remains an 
open question. A natural conjecture is that as long as k, is below k,, 
bequests are at a comer at zero, and capital accumulation proceeds as in a 
Diamond (1965) economy. When k, 2 k&, bequests are non-negative and at 
an interior, and capital accumulates as in (22) and (23). If this conjecture is 
verified, the capital stock of an economy with bequest motive converges, 
whatever k,, to the modified golden rule k* if y > (1 + n)/(l + F), and to the 
Diamond (1965) steady state k if y < (1 + n)/(l + F) - with bequests at a 
zero comer in both cases as long as k, < kb 
4. Bequests and uncertainty 
In the previous section, we have derived a condition for operative bequests 
within a, framework in which, because of the absence of uncertainty, the safe 
interest rate was always equal to the marginal productivity of capital. These 
two magnitudes will however in general differ when uncertainty is introduced, 
so that it is both conceptually and practically important to derive conditions 
for operative bequests within a stochastic environment, and to determine 
which rate of return, on safe or risky assets, matters for operative bequests. 
In order to keep the answer as simple as possible, we revert to the exchange 
economy with no storage studied in section 2, but now assume that the second 
period endowment e2 is stochastic, with 5 = Prob{ e, = e2j}, j = 1,. . . , J -z 00 
and cjlrj = 1. The first-period endowment remains non-random. Agents are 
assumed to be von Neumann-Morgenstem expected utility maximizers, so 
that, letting b,+ij denote the bequest an agent born at t plans to leave to 
his/her children at t + 1 if state j is realized, we have the following first-order 
conditions: 
8(1+n)u'[e2j-(1+n)b,+,j]=Yu'[e,+b,+,j], j=l,..., J. 
(25) 
The interpretation of (25) is the same as in the deterministic economy: 
agents choose state-contingent bequests such that, in every state, the marginal 
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cost of bequeathing one unit of good to each of the (1 + n) heirs be equal to 
the marginal altruistic benefit derived from observing these descendants con- 
sume this bequest in their young age. It is clear that the solutions to (25) are 
time-independent, with b,+ij = bj for all r, j = 1,. . . , J. Moreover, it is easily 
checked that bj is an increasing function of ezj, so that the old leave larger 
bequests to their heirs in ‘good’ states of nature. More importantly, we find 
that 
where 1 + Rj = u’(e,)/[ /.3u’(ezj)] is the marginal rate of substitution between 
first- and second-period consumption in state j when there are no bequests. 
(26) is analogous to the condition of Proposition 1; it tells us that for bequests 
to the operative in every state of nature, the bequest motive must be so strong 
that even in ‘catastrophic’ states of nature (in which eZj is at its minimum) 
agents choose to transfer goods to their descendants. 
(26) is obviously a very strong condition. In particular, it suffices that there 
be one state of nature such that the second-period endowment be zero with 
some positive probability to rule out that bequests be operative in every state 
[as we have assumed u’(O) = co]. 
An implication of (26) is that a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
bequests to be operative in every state is that 
y>(l+n)/(l+ff), (27) 
where 1 + d = {cjqj(l + ffj)-‘}-’ is the implicit safe rate of interest prevail- 
ing in the no-bequest intergenerational autarkic allocation. This is an interest- 
ing result, which establishes that, although it is the safe rate of interest and not 
the average risky rate which matters, the condition for operative bequests in a 
stochastic economy is more restrictive than the condition which prevails in a 
deterministic economy, even when the interest rate is suitably redefined. The 
fact that (27) is only necessary reflects the selection by agents of state-contin- 
gent bequests. 
What remains true in the stochastic economy is that dynamic inefficiency of 
the economy without bequest motive is suflicient to ensure that bequests 
cannot be operative in all states of nature. This results from the fact that when 
R < n, i.e., when the safe interest rate is below the growth rate, the economy 
without bequest motive is dynamically inefficient, in the (constrained optimal- 
ity) sense that the ex ante welfare of each generation could be improved by 
intergenerational transfers T > 0 from young to old. Such transfers clearly 
benefit the original old; as for later generations, the effect of this social 
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security program on their expected utility is measured by 
dEU(T)/dT= -u’[e, - T] +/3(1+n)&ju+,j+ (1 +n)T], 
i 
(28) 
which proves that the economy without bequest motive is inefficient whenever 
dE U(O)/dT= -u’[ e,] + /3(1+ rr) crrju’[ ezj] > 0, (29) 
i.e., when a -C n. But if a -C n, (27) is violated as y s 1, so that bequests 
cannot be operative in all states if the economy without bequest motive is 
dynamically inefficient. 
We conjecture that these results generalize to more complex stochastic 
environments, and that as long as bequests are state-contingent the condition 
for operative bequests involves a state-by-sttte comparison, and not simply the 
type of average comparison between y, R, and n contained in (27). As a 
consequence of the very restrictive nature of this state-by-state comparison, it 
is very unlikely that bequests may be operative in every state of nature in a 
stochastic economy. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has proved that Barro’s (1974) debt neutrality proposition, 
whose relevance hinges, in an economy with bequest motives, on bequests 
being operative in the absence of public debt, is not applicable to a wide class 
of overlapping generation economies - those with a weak bequest motive. In 
particular, we have shown that the bequest motive is always too weak, and 
public debt therefore non-neutral, when non-physical assets have a well- 
defined function (reducing oversavings) in the corresponding economy without 
bequest motive, i.e., when the non-altruistic economy is dynamically ineffi- 
cient. 
This result was reached without adding any of the usual ingredients deliver- 
ing non-neutrality (e.g., heterogeneous tastes, distortionary taxes) to Barro’s 
(1974) model, and within a variety of environments (exchange and production 
economies without uncertainty, random exchange economy). 
An important caveat to be kept in mind in interpreting the wider implica- 
tions of this conclusion is that a modification of consumers’ tastes to include a 
gift motive (concern for the welfare of ascendants) would, of course, modify 
our results. In particular, situations which lead to inoperative bequests may, 
but in general need not, be conducive to operative gifts and to the neutrality of 
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intertemporal lump-sum tax reallocations - a fact which would restrict, but 
not eliminate (relative to the range circumscribed in this article) the domain of 
inapplicability of Barro’s (1974) debt neutrality theorem. 
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